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Section 7 of the Charter and  




The criminal law can be bad for one’s health. In recent years, the 
threat or application of criminal sanction has been identified as a barrier 
to health-seeking behaviour in a number of areas,1 including sex work,2 
polygamy,3 sexual activity of people living with HIV,4 and various 
aspects of drug control.5 How courts draw the constitutional landscape in 
which health and criminal justice interact has important consequences for 
health and criminal policy, and more broadly for how communities and 
individuals shape their surroundings, which in turn can determine their 
health. This paper advances the claim that the interpretation of funda-
mental justice under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms6 should include consideration of the democratic legitimacy 
with which health-affecting criminal policy is made and, in particular, the 
role of those marginalized from ordinary democratic processes. 
In Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society,7 
the claimants sought to ensure the continued operation of Insite — North 
                                                                                                             
 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University. 
1 I leave aside a vast literature on the effects of criminal processes and incarceration them-
selves on physical and mental health. 
2 Kim Blankenship & Stephen Koester, “Criminal Law, Policing Policy, and HIV Risk in 
Female Sex Workers and Injection Drug Users” (2002) 30:4 J.L. Med. & Ethics 548. The negative 
safety impacts of prostitution laws were also recognized in Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2012] O.J. No. 1296, 2012 ONCA 186, at para. 111 (S.C.C.). 
3 Angela Campbell, “Bountiful Voices” (2009) 47:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 183. 
4 Eric Mykhalovskiy, “The Problem of ‘Significant Risk’: Exploring the Public Health 
Impact of Criminalizing HIV Non-disclosure” (2011) 73:5 Soc. Sci. Med. 668.  
5 Thomas Kerr, Will Small & Evan Wood, “The Public Health and Social Impacts of Drug 
Market Enforcement: A Review of the Evidence” (2005) 16:4 International Journal of Drug Policy 
210 [hereinafter “Kerr, Small & Wood”]. 
6 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
7 [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”]. 
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America’s first legally sanctioned safe injection site — without risking 
criminal punishment for Insite’s staff and clients. Insite had its origins in 
the grassroots movement for harm reduction in Vancouver’s Downtown 
Eastside, and was ultimately endorsed and realized through collaboration 
among local, federal and provincial authorities.8 After five years, Insite 
was threatened with closure when the federal government refused to 
renew the exemption from the application of federal drug laws under 
which Insite had been operating. Insite’s supporters wanted to keep the 
facility open for the simple reason that it was saving lives without 
harming anyone. Criminal prohibitions on possession and trade in drugs, 
the claimants argued, should not be permitted to threaten or interfere 
with Insite’s good work. 
The claimants in PHS were two Insite clients, a grassroots organiza-
tion of people who use drugs, and the non-profit organization that 
oversees the operation of the safe injection site. They moulded their 
claims into two constitutionally cognizable forms. First, they made a 
jurisdictional argument that the provincial policy establishing and 
supporting the safe injection site ought to take precedence over federal 
drug laws because provinces have legislative primacy over the regulation 
of health. Second, they argued that Insite ought to be constitutionally 
protected from federal drug laws because health, safety and life are 
fundamental rights that, in the circumstances, should prevail over other 
ends pursued by the criminal law. Remarkably, the claimants succeeded 
at each level of court (albeit on different bases), with only one dissenting 
judge at the Court of Appeal.9 The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately 
ruled to prevent criminal drug possession laws from impeding Insite’s 
operation on the basis of section 7 of the Charter. 
I argue that in building and interpreting the emerging substantive 
guarantee in section 7 of the Charter — that laws restricting life, liberty 
or personal security cannot be arbitrary, overbroad or disproportionate — 
justification and balancing between the means and ends of legislation 
should be conducted in light of the democratic context in which policies 
are created. Judicial legitimacy in setting and policing constitutional 
boundaries in complex areas of social policy like state responses to 
                                                                                                             
8 For a compelling narrative of how Insite was driven by grassroots efforts interacting with 
institutional support, see Hester Lessard, “Jurisdictional Justice, Democracy, and the Story of Insite” 
(2011) 19:3 Const Forum Const. 93, at 97-100 [hereinafter “Lessard”]. 
9 PHS Community Services Society v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] B.C.J. No. 951, 
2008 BCSC 661 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “PHS Trial Level”]; PHS Community Services Society v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2010] B.C.J. No. 57, 2010 BCCA 15 (B.C.C.A.). 
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potentially harmful drug use depends, certainly, on the strength and 
nature of the factual evidence about whether policy is doing what it 
purports to do. But it also depends on the relative democratic legitimacy 
of competing policy options. 
Courts defining and enforcing constitutional rights in complex areas 
of social policy are, understandably, reluctant to substitute judicial views 
for those of a democratically elected legislature. Yet some law-making 
processes might better account for the perspectives of its constituents 
than others. The broader arbitrariness analysis that I suggest would attend 
to the ways in which policy-making processes include or exclude 
marginalized and most-affected voices. If one underlying purpose of 
constitutional rights is to prevent majoritarian oppression,10 then it makes 
sense for courts to be more deferential to democratic decisions taken in 
contexts that mitigate that oppression. In PHS, this means that the 
Supreme Court made the right decision in finding that section 7 of the 
Charter precludes the criminal law from interfering with Insite’s work. In 
coming to that decision, however, it ought to have considered not only 
the effectiveness of Insite in promoting health and safety relative to 
blanket criminal prohibition, but also Insite’s unique democratic pedigree 
and the democratic deficits affecting ordinary criminal legislation. 
An evaluation of a law’s arbitrariness, overbreadth or proportionality 
that responds to power imbalances within democratic institutions can be 
understood to carry jurisdictional implications by favouring laws created 
through processes that better account for the interests of those who may 
be marginalized in ordinary political processes. In this way, Charter 
analysis may develop to achieve what traditional jurisdictional analysis 
has so far been unable to: the promotion of better representation in 
decision making that affects fundamental issues like health. 
II. BACKGROUND: DEMOCRACY, RIGHTS AND JURISDICTION 
After the British Columbia Court of Appeal decided in favour of the 
complainants on both Charter and division of powers grounds, a number 
of scholars, however supportive of the outcome of the case, bemoaned 
the narrow approach taken by the Court of Appeal majority on the 
                                                                                                             
10 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Consti-
tution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), at 15-31. 
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question of jurisdiction.11 Gillian Calder and Hester Lessard felt that the 
justice claims which compelled the courts to support Insite’s continued 
existence had been obscured by the Court of Appeal’s treatment of the 
jurisdictional question. Applying the doctrine of “interjurisdictional 
immunity”, the majority had held that Insite was a provincial undertaking 
that fit within a “core” of provincial health powers, and that federal laws 
could not limit it. The court had relied on textual analysis, restricting the 
scope of its consideration narrowly to two levels of government — 
federal and provincial. In doing so, the court had considered it irrelevant 
to the jurisdictional question that Insite served the life-and-death needs 
and had been created through the grass roots efforts of a group with 
limited access to political processes. 
Calling prevailing jurisdictional doctrine “arid”, “formal” and “tech-
nical”, Calder and Lessard urged a federalism doctrine that better serves 
its underlying purpose of reconciling diversity and unity while furthering 
democracy.12 Such a doctrine should take more substantive account of 
political and social marginalization. This far more robust conceptualiza-
tion of federalism — where law-making power is situated not only 
according to where it is textually assigned, but according to where it 
enjoys the most legitimacy — has ample support among scholars,13 but 
has arguably played a limited role in shaping judicial doctrine.14 
The division of powers argument was ultimately rejected by the 
Supreme Court. The unanimous panel determined that interjurisdictional 
immunity would not apply because it would have ousted the federal 
competence to legislate in ways that would affect health. This, it held, 
would be inconsistent with principles of cooperative federalism, as well 
as the notion that regulating the use of drugs could not neatly be divided 
into health questions within exclusive provincial competence and 
criminal law questions within federal competence.15 
Instead, the Supreme Court relied on the more explicitly values-
driven Charter holding that the Minister’s refusal to grant an exemption 
                                                                                                             
11 Lessard, supra, note 8, at 103-104; Gillian Calder, “Insite: Right Answer, Wrong Ques-
tion” (2011) 19:3 Const. Forum Const. 113 [hereinafter “Calder”]. 
12 Calder, id.; Lessard, id. 
13 See, e.g., Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Canadian Federal Experiment, or 
Legalism Without Federalism? Toward a Legal Theory of Federalism” in Manuel Calvo-Garcia & 
William Felstiner, eds., Federalismo / Federalism (Madrid: Dyckinson, 2004), at 81; Robert C. Post 
& Reva B. Siegel, “Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation 
of the Family and Medical Leave Act” (2003) 112:8 Yale L.J. 1943. 
14 See, e.g., Eugénie Brouillet, “Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: 
Should We Open Pandora’s Box?” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 601. 
15 PHS, supra, note 7, at paras. 67-70. 
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from the application of criminal drug possession laws to Insite’s clients 
and staff would arbitrarily and grossly disproportionately limit their 
section 7 rights to life, liberty and security of the person. 
In deciding the matter on Charter grounds, one might have expected 
the Court’s decision to be more directly animated by concerns around the 
protection of minorities and recognizing unique forms of grassroots and 
democratic engagement that led to Insite’s creation in the first place. It 
was not. 
Calder and Lessard’s analysis of the poverty of jurisdictional analysis 
suggests the broad argument I pursue in this paper: just as they argue 
equality and democratic values ought to shape jurisdictional analysis, so 
too should the interpretation of Charter rights be responsive to the 
contextual democratic legitimacy of processes through which a facility 
like Insite is created. In doing so, section 7 can play a role in assigning 
law-making authority to the places in which it is most legitimate. Section 
7 of the Charter could thus serve a jurisdictional function in contexts like 
this one. 
III. INSITE: A NARROW DECISION? 
Given the many ways in which criminal law might negatively affect 
health, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in 
PHS was cabined.16 It has been argued that PHS presented relatively few 
challenges to the judicial role on the facts.17 The Court was able to keep 
its section 7 analysis narrow and shallow18 in two primary ways. First, it 
side-stepped the issue of evaluating the constitutionality of the Con-
trolled Drugs and Substances Act19 itself, instead limiting its scrutiny to 
the Federal Minister of Health’s discretionary decision to deny Insite an 
exemption from the law under section 56 of the Act. Second, it kept its 
focus on the evidence of Insite’s responsiveness to health and safety 
issues specific to Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside. 
                                                                                                             
16 See, e.g., Rahool P. Agarwal, “Case Comment: Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS 
Community Services Society” (2011) 20:2 Const. Forum. Const. 41 [hereinafter “Agarwal”] 
(suggesting that the decision may have little precedential value for new safe injection sites that might 
seek to be established). 
17 Jeremy Webber, “Section 7, Insite, and the Competence of Courts” (2011) 19:3 Const. 
Forum Const. 125. 
18 See Cass R. Sunstein, “Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided” (1996-1997) 110:4 Harv. 
L. Rev. 4, at 14-23. 
19 S.C. 1996, c. 19 [hereinafter “CDSA”]. 
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By shifting the focus away from the prohibitions themselves and to-
ward the Minister of Health’s exercise of discretion under section 56 of 
the Act,20 the Court avoided pronouncing on health-affecting criminal 
offences outside the CDSA.21 The Court stated that “[i]f the Act con-
sisted solely of blanket prohibitions with no provision for exemptions for 
necessary medical or scientific use of drugs, the assertions that it was 
arbitrary, overbroad, and disproportionate in its effects might gain some 
traction”,22 adding that “the availability of [section 56] exemptions acts 
as a safety valve that prevents the CDSA from applying where such 
application would be arbitrary, overly broad, or grossly disproportionate 
to its effects.”23 
Most criminal offences do not benefit from health-related exemption 
provisions like section 56. This leaves discretion in the application of the 
law with police and prosecutors. Courts have so far maintained a very 
deferential standard of review for police and prosecutorial discretion24 
(although PHS might call this practice into question). Moreover, many of 
the harms associated with criminalization of things like sex work, sexual 
exposure of HIV or polygamy come from the mere threat of criminal 
sanction. Finally, even in the context of drug control, where the section 
56 exemption is available, not all circumstances lend themselves to the 
section 56 process. For example, neighbourhood crackdowns have been 
found to interfere with peoples’ own individual health-seeking behav-
iour,25 but it is difficult to imagine the application of a section 56 
exemption that could practicably address those harms. 
In addition, in finding the Minister’s exercise of discretion both arbi-
trary and grossly disproportionate to the CDSA’s purposes of protecting 
health and safety, the Court relied on facts and circumstances specific to 
Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside. First, traditional criminal prohibitions 
on drug use were not working to protect health and safety in that area.26 
                                                                                                             
20 The trial judge, by contrast, considered the Minister’s discretion under s. 56 of the Act to 
be unfettered, and therefore confined his analysis to the constitutionality of the possession and 
trafficking provisions alone. See PHS Trial Level, supra, note 9, at paras. 154-156. 
21 PHS, supra, note 7, at para. 118 (distinguishing this case from R. v. Parker, [2000] O.J. No. 
2787, 49 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), in which the s. 56 mechanism was not yet sufficiently developed at 
an administrative level for it to be of use to a claimant seeking to legally obtain medical marijuana). 
22 Id., at para 109 (emphasis added). 
23 Id., at para. 113. 
24 See R. v. Regan, [2002] S.C.J. No. 14, 2002 SCC 12, at paras. 166-169 (S.C.C.); Krieger 
v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] S.C.J. No. 45, 2002 SCC 65, at paras. 45-49 (S.C.C.); R. v. Nixon, 
[2011] S.C.J. No. 34, 2011 SCC 34, at para. 64 (S.C.C.). 
25 See Kerr, Small & Wood, supra, note 5. 
26 PHS, supra, note 7, at para. 131. 
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Insite had been introduced to respond to a crisis of increasing severity: 
between 1987 and 1993, deaths from overdose per year had risen from 
16 to 200. In 1996, HIV and Hepatitis C epidemics were reported. A 
public health emergency was declared in 1997.27 Second, supervised 
injection had been proven to minimize the risk of death and disease to 
injection drug users.28 Finally, and most importantly in the Court’s view, 
Insite in fact furthered, rather than undermined, the health and safety 
purposes of the CDSA. It had intervened in 336 overdoses since 2006, 
and encouraged clients to seek counselling, detoxification and treatment, 
all without increasing local crime rates, incidents of public injection, or 
relapse rates of injection drug users.29 In other words, the Supreme Court 
found that on the facts, closely examined, there was no reason to believe 
that the denial would further the CDSA’s objectives. 
The court’s heavy reliance on the particular circumstances in Van-
couver’s Downtown Eastside, and on the proven benefits of Insite during 
the period in which it did operate under a section 56 exemption, has led 
some commentators to conclude that its impact on health-affecting 
criminal laws may be limited.30 There is no other area in Canada that 
resembles the open-air drug market of the Downtown Eastside. And of 
course, without an initial section 56 exemption, it may be difficult for 
other would-be safe injection sites to demonstrate their contextual 
effectiveness or the lack of negative neighbourhood impacts. On its face, 
the decision falls well short of recognizing, for example, a free-standing 
right of people who use drugs to access suitable, evidence-based health 
services free from criminal law interference, much less to recognizing 
any democratic superiority of the unique collaboration between grass 
roots and government actors that led to Insite’s creation over the ordinary 
democratic processes that generated the CDSA. 
IV. INSITE: A DOCTRINAL EXPANSION 
Despite the limitations outlined above, the Court was in some ways 
bolder than might have been expected from previous Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
27 Id., at para. 11. 
28 Id., at para. 131. 
29 Id. 
30 Agarwal, supra, note 16. 
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jurisprudence. First, it showed no deference at all to a ministerial 
decision that was, on the face of the statute, a discretionary one.31 
Second, it undertook a far more searching review of the facts sup-
porting the Minister’s decision than some prior judicial decisions on the 
arbitrariness standard would have suggested. In R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. 
Caine, for example, the government had successfully defended marijuana 
possession laws against a recreational user’s allegations of arbitrariness 
by demonstrating simply that the law was “rationally connected to a 
reasonable apprehension of harm”.32 Relying on a belief that “marijuana 
can cause problems of varying nature and severity to some people”, the 
Supreme Court stated: “we think the Charter allows Parliament a broad, 
though certainly not unlimited, legislative capacity to respond.”33 
Following Malmo-Levine, the Court in PHS might have upheld the 
decision on the (blinkered) basis that some people might be discouraged 
from using drugs by the exception-free application of the possession laws 
in the CDSA. Instead, the Court looked beyond the conceptual relation-
ship between the CDSA prohibition on drug possession and the health 
and safety of Insite’s clients to evaluate whether the Minister’s decision 
was arbitrary. 
The expansion of section 7 scrutiny of substantive criminal prohibi-
tions beyond the notional relationships of a piece of legislation’s means 
to its ends opens up new possibilities for Charter review on the basis of 
the social impact of criminal justice policy. It also risks generating 
concern about judicial overstepping, to which the Court in PHS was 
alive: 
The issue of illegal drug use and addiction is a complex one which 
attracts a variety of social, political, scientific and moral reactions. 
There is room for disagreement between reasonable people concerning 
how addiction should be treated. It is for relevant governments, not the 
Court, to make criminal and health policy.34 
In fact, PHS is not the first Supreme Court decision to require that 
section 7 arbitrariness be evaluated with close attention to legislation’s 
                                                                                                             
31 See Kent Roach, “The Supreme Court’s Remedial Decision in the Insite Decision” 
(2012) 6 J. Parl. & Polit. L. 238. For a discussion of the tensions inherent to Charter review of 
exercises of statutory discretion, see David Mullan, “Section 7 and Administrative Law Deference: 
No Room at the Inn?” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 227. 
32 [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 136 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added). 
33 Id., at para. 135. 
34 PHS, supra, note 7, at para. 105 (S.C.C.). 
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effectiveness in reality. In Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),35 the 
Court famously struck down the Quebec government’s prohibition on 
obtaining private health insurance for publicly ensured services for 
violating the Quebec Charter. Three of the four majority judges also 
found that the prohibition was arbitrary and violated section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter. They based their decision on their own finding, 
contrary to that of the trial judge, that the insurance prohibition, however 
rationally connected to the protection of the public health care system, 
was not in fact necessary on a close examination of the evidence. This 
position was justified primarily with reference to how other Western 
democracies managed to maintain effective public health care systems 
without such prohibitions.36 And indeed, the decision was subjected to 
sharp criticism for judicial misapprehension of the facts.37 Critics 
contended that there was plenty of evidence suggesting that expanding 
access to private health care would negatively affect the public health 
care system, and that the Court was improperly imposing its own 
ideology rather than objectively evaluating that evidence.38 
The turn to closer scrutiny of the impacts of legislation in the arbi-
trariness/overbreadth/disproportionality analysis is welcome. But, as 
suggested by the previous section, it can be difficult and costly for 
applicants to build a strong evidence-based record to support a Charter 
challenge, particularly where they are members of poor and marginalized 
groups. Martha Jackman has convincingly argued that such applicants 
tend to carry a much higher burden of proof than the government in 
similar constitutional cases.39 In the next section, I argue that the eviden-
tial burden on claimants in a case like PHS should be eased where they 
are urging courts to overrule a legislative policy created through ordinary 
democratic processes (like the CDSA) with one created with special 
                                                                                                             
35 [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. 
36 Id., at paras. 134-149. 
37 See, e.g., Hamish Stewart, “Implications of Chaoulli for Fact-Finding in Constitutional 
Cases” in Colleen Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to Justice 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) 209; Charles J. Wright, “Different Interpretations of 
‘Evidence’ and Implications for the Canadian Healthcare System”, id., at 220; Theodore R. Marmor, 
“Canada’s Supreme Court and its National Health Insurance Program: Evaluating the Landmark 
Chaoulli Decision from a Comparative Perspective” (2006) 44:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 311. 
38 See, e.g., Christopher Manfredi, “Déjà Vu All Over Again: Chaoulli and the Limits of 
Judicial Policymaking” in Access to Care, Access to Justice, id., 139. 
39 Martha Jackman, “Reality Checks: Presuming Innocence and Proving Guilt in Charter 
Welfare Cases” in Margot Young, Susan Boyd & Sheilagh Day, eds., Poverty Rights, Social 
Citizenship, Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 24. 
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attention to, and participation of, marginalized groups (like the process 
that generated Insite). 
V. ON JUDICIAL CAPACITY AND LEGITIMACY IN SUBSTANTIVE 
REVIEW OF HEALTH-AFFECTING CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS 
The Court in PHS limited its explicit reliance on social science evi-
dence to information about the effects of Insite on its clients and the 
surrounding community. But deference need not depend solely on the 
strength of the social science evidence about means and ends. If the basis 
for judicial deference in areas like this one is concern about courts’ 
relative capacity and legitimacy to intervene in complex questions of 
social policy (here, the proper response to the health and public safety 
questions around drug use), then courts should consider those capacity 
and legitimacy concerns in determining the level of deference they owe 
governments in a given situation.40 Justice Deschamps’ reasons in 
Chaoulli affirm this, even if the Court did not apply its own principles 
satisfactorily: 
The court’s reasons for showing deference must always reflect the two 
guiding principles of justification: the measure must be consistent with 
democratic values and it must be necessary to maintain public order 
and the general well-being of citizens. The variety of circumstances 
that may be presented to a court is not conducive to the rigidity of an 
exhaustive list.41 
In PHS, the Court did not advert directly to the democratic legiti-
macy of Insite itself in the context of its arbitrariness analysis. In the 
introductory paragraphs to the decision, however, the Court notes the 
democratic pedigree of North America’s first legally sanctioned safe 
injection site: “Insite was the product of cooperative federalism. Local, 
provincial and federal authorities combined their efforts to create it. It 
was launched as an experiment. That experiment has proven success-
ful.”42 Ultimately, it is the success of Insite, and not the circumstances 
                                                                                                             
40 Cf. Lorne M. Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada 
(Toronto: Thomson Canada Limited, 1999), at 233-37 (suggesting that courts ought to determine 
justiciability on a case-by-case basis, depending on whether they have the institutional capacity and 
legitimacy to adjudicate the claim). 
41 Chaoulli, supra, note 35, at para. 93 (emphasis added). 
42 PHS, supra, note 7, at para. 19. 
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through which it was created or the marginalization of the population it 
serves, that forms the basis of the Court’s section 7 decision. 
And yet, a number of features underscore Insite’s legitimacy as an 
experiment in local democracy. First, it was created through grassroots 
organizing.43 The Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (“VANDU”) 
represented and was comprised of members from the most marginalized 
groups whose interests are least likely to be represented in traditional 
elected government. In addition, Insite was made possible by the provin-
cial transfer of responsibility for adult alcohol and drug services to 
regional health authorities. Giving local communities a greater say in 
health policies that affect them and ensuring evidence-based health 
practices were among the key purposes underlying regionalization of 
health service design and priority setting.44 Regionalization grew out of 
the perception that health care resource distribution needed to be more 
democratically responsive. 
This case can thus be distinguished from Chaoulli. There, the Court 
replaced a decision made through ordinary democratic processes (the 
provincial ban on insurance) with the Court’s perceived default “state of 
nature” (the freedom to obtain private insurance). It justified its decision 
with reference to its own (much criticized) factual findings that the 
insurance ban threatened lives in the context of insufficient resources 
within the health care system, and that the insurance ban was not 
necessary to protect the integrity of the public health care system.45 The 
Court did gesture toward some facts supporting the democratic legiti-
macy of its decision. It noted, for example, that the provincial govern-
ment had already recognized and committed itself to fixing the problem 
of wait times within the public health care system.46 In other words, the 
Court relied on evidence that its decision had already been supported by 
a government that was dragging its heels and failing to take action on a 
problem it recognized. But relative to PHS, the democratic legitimacy of 
the Court’s decision to strike down the provincial insurance ban was 
weak. 
                                                                                                             
43 See Lessard, supra, note 8. 
44 Steven Lewis & Denise Kouri, “Regionalization: Making Sense of the Canadian Expe-
rience” (2004) 5 HealthCare Papers 12, at 15-20; Colleen Flood, Duncan Sinclair & Joanna Erdman, 
“Steering and Rowing in Health Care: The Devolution Option” (2004) 30:1 Queen’s L.J. 156; 
Jonathan Lomas, “Devolving Authority for Health Care in Canada’s Provinces: 4. Emerging Issues 
and Prospects” (1997) Can. Med. Assoc. J. 817, at 818. 
45 Chaoulli, supra, note 35, at para. 106; see contra, supra, note 37. 
46 Chaoulli, id., at para. 96. 
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In PHS, the Court was asked to choose between two democratically 
supported options. On the one hand was the Minister’s decision to 
maintain criminal law obstacles to Insite’s operation, a capacity that 
derives its authority from ordinary democratic processes at the federal 
level. On the other was a facility established through the collaboration of 
multiple levels of government authority and the participation of those 
most affected by the appeal’s success or failure. The Court thus overruled 
a Minister’s decision that not only ignored overwhelming scientific 
evidence of Insite’s effectiveness and placed lives at risk, but was 
democratic only in the sense that it emanated from the discretion of a 
Minister whose authority derived from the democratically elected federal 
government. In a contest of relative democratic legitimacy, the provincial 
policy arguably won. 
Discussion of the relative democratic legitimacy of Insite was no-
where to be seen in the section 7 arbitrariness/overbreadth analysis. But 
it represents the other half of a principled approach to managing defer-
ence in these kinds of claims: not only should the measure be sufficiently 
related to its objective on the facts, it should also be consistent with 
democratic principles.47 Relative democratic legitimacy may also more 
fully explain the disposition of the case in light of the emphasis the Court 
placed in its introductory paragraphs on: (a) the unique collaborative and 
participatory process that generated Insite; and (b) the extraordinary 
marginalization of the community that Insite served.48 
There are two principal ways in which democratic legitimacy might 
factor into section 7 adjudication. A court might consider relative 
democratic legitimacy as it sets the level of deference it will give to a 
challenged law or policy as an expression of democratic choice. Thus, for 
example, the court might maintain the Chaoulli rule that a law is arbi-
trary where it fails to align with its goals in practice, but exercise less 
strict scrutiny of that alignment where that law is created through efforts 
designed to compensate for democratic deficits in ordinary law-making 
processes. Where, as here, the law in question is made through ordinary 
democratic processes, the court might more closely scrutinize the 
means/end fit and be more likely to find it unsatisfactory where there is a 
competing, constitutional and more effective policy that does a better job 
representing marginalized voices. 
                                                                                                             
47 See supra, notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
48 PHS, supra, note 7, at paras. 7-9. 
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A bolder and perhaps more honest approach would explicitly recog-
nize democratic legitimacy within or among the principles of fundamen-
tal justice, while acknowledging that such legitimacy is a relative 
concept. In other words, courts might require that laws limiting life, 
liberty and security of the person be relatively democratically legitimate 
in order not to run afoul of section 7 as a principle of fundamental 
justice. Certainly, democratic rule with attention to minority exclusion 
would count among the “basic tenets of our legal system”.49 
The marginalization of particular groups from ordinary law-making 
processes could likewise be addressed within the concept of arbitrariness. 
Arbitrariness would be enlarged from its present meaning under section 7 
— state power wielded in a manner that is insufficiently connected to the 
goals it purports to serve — to include power wielded by a majority 
without sufficient consideration of and representation from most-affected 
and marginalized actors. This would accord with understandings of 
arbitrariness that focus on unrestrained, autocratic or overweening use of 
authority — tyrannical majoritarianism. 
A possible objection to this suggestion is that the focus on democ-
ratic legitimacy might undermine the strength of individual rights claims 
to protect minority positions. One can easily imagine how some commu-
nity initiatives might become oppressive to some groups in the future. 
Should courts support such initiatives simply because they appear to 
enjoy more democratic legitimacy understood as grassroots engagement 
beyond electoral participation? 
I suggest that courts might avoid the trap of diluting rights or rein-
forcing oppressive democratic choice by keeping the focus on the goal of 
protecting against health-affecting policy choices that are of questionable 
effectiveness and represent overweening majoritarianism. Only those 
grass roots efforts that favour traditionally underrepresented groups and 
individuals would qualify as democracy-enhancing. Careful attention to 
context is necessary here. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have argued that section 7 of the Charter should have 
jurisdictional implications in the sense that it should favour more 
participatorily created schemes, ones with greater democratic legitimacy 
                                                                                                             
49 Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 30 (S.C.C.). 
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broadly understood, particularly in relation to groups that are marginal-
ized from ordinary political processes. This is not to suggest that the 
demonstrated success of harm reduction or other approaches to health 
and well-being that may require the withdrawal of criminal solutions 
should not matter. They do. But where the factual record is not as full — 
and indeed, for reasons explained earlier, future challenges may not 
benefit from the same rich factual record50 — courts should remember to 
measure their own institutional competence to intervene on a case-by-
case basis, bearing in mind the extent to which concerns about judicial 
meddling in democratic decision making might, as here, be mitigated. 
The recent passing of Bill C-10 is expected to generate a number of 
constitutional challenges in relation to mandatory minimum sentences, 
prison conditions and the disparate impact of amendments on Aboriginal 
persons and people requiring mental health care.51 Quebec Minister of 
Justice Jean-Marc Fournier has announced his intention to do everything 
he can to soften the impact of Bill C-10 in Quebec.52 The Charter may 
prove to be a novel lens through which to consider jurisdictional justice. 
                                                                                                             
50 See supra, notes 27 to 32 and accompanying text. 
51 See Canadian Civil Liberties Association, “Bill C-10, The Omnibus Crime Bill: Unwise, 
Unjust, Unconstitutional”, online: <http://www.ccla.org/omnibus-crime-bill-c-10/>. 
52 “Quebec Vows to Limit Clout of Conservative Crime Bill” Canadian Press (March 12 
2012), online: CTV News <http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/CanadaAM/20120313/quebec-to-fight-
bill-c-10-120313/>. 
